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In a framework similar to the models of expectation on economic
policy, we purpose a model where the government subsidizes ¯rms
privatized by massive giveaways to the managers who are empire-
builders. The government injects funds because its aim is to avoid a
drastic fall of output when a negative external macroshock hits the
country. The consequence is that the economy can be locked into a
soft budget constraint equilibrium and a path of underdevelopment.
At the heart of the model there are i) the behavior of managers, ii) the
macroshock and iii) the credibility of the government when it a±rms
that it stops subsidies. Therefore, we argue that the model explains
why the soft budget constraint syndrome is worse in the CIS than
in the Central European Countries: massive giveaways, largely used
in the CIS, do not avoid that unproductive managers divert funds
when an important macroshock hits the economy (worse in the CIS)
and governments are not credible. Finally we derive from the model
some policy recommendations: ¯rst, to create an economic union with
Articles prohibiting any subsidies which favor unrestructured ¯rms;
second, to privatize and restructure the banking system, i.e. to ap-
ply standard risk analysis technics in order to strengthen the budget
constraint.
JEL classi¯cation: E6, P31
Keywords: Transition, privatization, soft budget constraint, economic union.
¤ROSES-CNRS, University Paris I Panth¶ eon-Sorbonne, 106-112 Bd de l'H^ opital 75647
Paris CEDEX 13, France. Email: Fabian.Gouret@malix.univ-paris1.fr, Fax: 33(0)1 44 07
81 91, Phone: 33 (0)1 44 07 81 94.
1The Macroeconomics of Massive Giveaways 2
1 Introduction
Privatization is widely considered as one of the centerpieces of the pro-
cessus of transition in the former communist countries. It is an institutional
large-scale policy reform and there is agreement that privatisation of State-
owned enterprises (SOE) will have a positive large impact on the economy's
output level, if not in its rate of growth1.
Nevertheless, the macroeconomic gains associated to privatization appear
not prominent. Zinnes et al [2001] have included in panel data regressions an
indicator which captures the depth of privatization in order to explain the
behavior of output. They show that privatization does not have a signi¯cant
impact, unless the budgetary constraint is hard enough and the legal and
institutional framework which permits to owners to control their ¯rms ex-
ists. In a similar macroeconometric framework, Gouret [2003] ¯nds that all
depends on the privatization policy which is put in practice: massive give-
aways can lock a country into a path of economic underdevelopment, whereas
countries which decide to privatize by gradual sales have a positive impact
of privatization on the output behavior.
We have to remember that at the beginning of transition a big part of
the SOE were yielding a negative return (Duch^ ene [1993], Hugues and Hare
[1991]). Private investors would not have acquired ¯rms whom assets yield
a negative expected return. So two strategies were possible: i) a strategy
of gradual sales, that we can describe in three phases. First, the control by
the State of SOE is ¯rmly reestablished (Debande and Friebel [2004]) and
it avoids that (unproductive) managers abuse and divert capital or funds
which are for restructuring. Second, the government injects funds to re-
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structure SOE which yield after the restructuration a positive return. Third,
the preprivatization restructuration serves as a useful screening device in or-
der to interest private investors, who buy the ¯rms. When they are foreign
investors, they back the ¯rms by giving them an injection of new capital
and some intangible assets concerning the functioning of a market economy
(Kornai [2000]).
ii) The other strategy was to privatize by massive giveaways and let the
new private owners to restructure the ¯rms. In Russia where a mass pri-
vatization to insiders was applied, Chubais, who was privatization minister
from 1992 to 1994, proclaimed that \he didn't speak, he privatized" (in Ko-
rnai [2000]). In Czech Republic where a mass privatization to outsiders was
applied, Klaus, who was ¯rst minister from 1992 to 1997 claimed that \the
whole concept of the economic transformation is to privatize as quickly as
possible and let new owners decide" (in Grosfeld and Senik [1996]). They
were thinking that the change of ownership was a necessary and a su±cient
condition of capitalism (Kornai [2000]). They thought that privatization
might have provided managers with stronger incentives to exert e®ort be-
cause the cash °ow rights were transfered to them. But, as Debande and
Friebel [2004] argue, managers may be empire-builders (Jensen [1986]) or
face powerful worker collectives. In such a case, privatization may weaken
incentives because managers who receive control over the restructuring funds
can divert the funds in order to ¯nance losses. And the government is willing
to inject another funds in order to avoid high unemployment.
In this paper, we deal with massive giveaways, soft budget constraint
(SBC2) and the behavior of output in a theoretical framework similar to the
models of expectation on economic policy (Barro and Gordon [1983], Flood
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and Marion [1998]). We link the soft budget constraint syndrome to the
method of privatization, massive giveaways to insiders, and to the negative
external macroshocks which hit the economy. As it is the case in Russia, the
State has privatized SOE by massive giveaways to managers. It has been
interested in obtaining an output level close to the natural output, i.e. an
economy where privatization has provided incentives to have e±cient ¯rms
and where subsidizes are not necessary to avoid bankruptcy. Unfortunately,
managers are empire-builders µ a la Jensen. If they expect that the govern-
ment continues to subsidize their loss making ¯rms, they do not make e®orts
in order to restructure. The government subsidizes the ¯rms because it fears
a too important fall in output when a negative external macroshock hits the
economy. Indeed, if it does not ¯rms goes to bankruptcy and unemploy-
ment rises drastically. But if private managers expect a strengthen of the
budget constraint, they restructure the ¯rms because they fear the ¯rms to
be liquidated. We believe this result is new because usually the theoretical
micro literature on SBC3 does not link its syndrome to negative external
macroshocks.
The traditional SBC theoretical literature is based on the model of Dewa-
tripont and Maskin [1995]. In these types of model, the equilibrium is a SBC
because there is asymmetric information about a project: in a ¯rst period
1 an enterprise asks a fund for a project to a private or State-owned bank
which can not identify if the project is e±cient or not. If the bank injects
the fund and it realizes ex-post that it is an ine±cient project, it can be
more interesting for it to re¯nance the project in 2 than to ask for a liquida-
tion. First, re¯nancing is better than a liquidation ex-post because the initial
injection of fund is sunk. Second, when the funding source is a paternalis-
3For a survey of theoretical literature on SBC, see Kornai et al [2003].The Macroeconomics of Massive Giveaways 5
tic government (that maximizes the overall social welfare of a project), the
SBC syndrome is stressed because it takes care of the negative e®ect on the
rest of the economy that a strengthen of the budget constraint can induce.
The enterprise anticipates being rescued when they get into trouble so they
submit poor projects which are re¯nanced. Dewatripont and Roland [2000]
and Kornai et al [2003] use the Dewatripont and Maskin model as a starting
point to understand why the SBC syndrome is worse in socialist and transi-
tion countries than in capitalist ones and how to alleviate the SBC problem.
They demonstrate that the SBC syndrome is worse in transition economies
because: the provider of funds is a State-owned agency which maximizes the
overall social welfare of a project, the banking system is centralized, banks
are rent-seekers, economic activity in transition economies is monopolistic,
the average quality of new enterprises is low and the government decisions
are centralized. But none of this reason deals with external macroshock like
transition. It is precisely this gap that we aim to redress in the present paper.
For this purpose, we transplant the SBC syndrome in a model of expectation
on economic policy like the model of Barro and Gordon [1983]. It is possible
because the SBC is a commitment problem like the commitment problem for
monetary policy.
In section 2, we present our model's framework. More speci¯cally, the
State has privatized the ¯rms to managers µ a la Jensen. They do not make
e®ort to restructure their loss-making ¯rms if they expect that the govern-
ment continues to subsidize them. The main result is that if a macroshock
hits the economy, the country locks into a soft budget constraint equilibrium
and a path of underdevelopment. In section 3, we highlight the model ex-
plains that massive giveaways, largely used in the CIS, do not avoid that
unproductive managers divert funds when i) an important macroshock hitsThe Macroeconomics of Massive Giveaways 6
the economy and ii) governments are not reliable when they a±rm that they
stop subsidies. Therefore, we contends that the model explains very well
why the persistence of the soft budget constraint is worse in the CIS than in
the Central European Countries (CEC). Russia and Ukraine implement mas-
sive giveaways, contrary to Hungary and Poland which apply gradual sales.
Unfortunately, the formers i) face an external macroshock (the collapse of
the CMEA) which is worse that the one which hits the CEC and ii) their
governments are not so reliable. Finally, we make two policy recommenda-
tions: to obligate the government to follow the rule by including in Treaties
of economic unions articles on the matter; to restructure and privatize the
banks in order to escape of the SBC equilibrium. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
In our model the government has to minimize a loss function as in Barro
and Gordon [1983] or Flood and Marion [1998]. The concern is the subsidies
the government makes to the ¯rms which has been privatized by massive
giveaways. Cash °ow rights has been transfered to managers to provide
them with restructuring incentives4. Unfortunately, policymakers have given
away \ownership and control to existing oligarchs -nomenklatura managers
whose dominated those ¯rms-" because they have leaned on them for support
(Stern in Hirschler [2000]). And \prestige, power [...] motivate management
rather than the pursuit of the creation of economic value" (Ericson [1999]).
In brief, they prefer to stay in a statu quo situation, they are empire-builders
4Note that during the Soviet Union, control rights had been gradually delegated from
ministries to management. This form of ownership provides bad incentive to yield posi-
tive return because insiders are not sanctioned by their actions. So the objective of the
transfer of cash °ow rights to insiders is equivalent to a decision of internalization of the
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managers. It means that it is more interesting for them to ask for subsidies
to the government than to restructure their loss-making ¯rms.
Output is determined in t by equation 1:
Yt = Yt + a}t ¡ bE(}t) ¡ u (1)
where Y is the natural output level, } is the importance of softness of the
budget constraint, E(}) is the expectation by the managers of the privatized
¯rms of the softness of the budget constraint. u is an external macro dis-
turbance. a and b are coe±cients with b > a. At the beginning (in t), the
privatized sector makes losses and is not productive. But the government
subsidies the loss-making ¯rms so they are not liquidated. Therefore we are
in a SBC equilibrium, i.e. E(}) = } > 0 and the output Y ¤ is such as
Y ¤ < Y ¡ u.
If the government decides to harden the budget constraint in t+1 (}t+1 =
0) and the managers do not anticipate it (E(}t+1) = }t), the output falls
because ¯rms are not restructured and they are liquidated. Therefore the
output in t +1, Y ¤¤, is such as the economy is in a worse state than the one
in t (Y ¤¤ < Y ¤). If managers anticipate a strength of the budget constraint
(E(}) = 0), they prefer to restructure because if they do not, they fear to be
in bankruptcy. So they restructure the ¯rms which become more productive
and pro¯table. In such case the output Y ¤¤¤ is such as Y ¤¤¤ = Y ¡ u.
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Now, we introduce a ¯xed cost (C) which occurs if the economy stays
in a SBC equilibrium. It is costly to stay in such a situation for at least
two reasons: i) the subsidies are ¯nanced by the taxation of a new private
sector which can not emerge if the taxes are too important. We know that
the bottom up development of the private sector is as important as the
restructuration of existing assets because it supplies products which were
in shortage during the socialist era and permits to have a more competitive
economy. So it is necessary to provide favorable conditions which is not
the case if it is taxed. ii) foreign direct investments do not °ow in such anThe Macroeconomics of Massive Giveaways 9
economy because taxation is too high, output level is low and to ¯nd good
local providers is di±cult. But if we are in a situation such as:




a2 ¡ bE(}) = u (9)
we can derive proposition 1.
Proposition 1 If the government sets the policy after observing the negative
external macroshock u such as u >
q
2C(1+a2)
a2 ¡bE(}), the economy stays in
a SBC equilibrium.
The proposition 1 is very closed to the models of time inconsistency poli-
cymaking of Barro and Gordon [1983]: if the government sets the policy after
observing the external disturbance which shocks the economy and managers
understand the temptation that the government faces, managers expect to
obtain subsidies and do not restructure their ¯rms. And it is optimal for the
government to con¯rm this expectation, because if it does not, the output
falls drastically. So the economy stays in a SBC equilibrium and in a path
of underdevelopment.
We can easily show that we can have 3 equilibria too if there is uncertainty
on the macroshock. Let's imagine that expectations are rational and u can
take the value ¹ with probability (p) and ¹ with probability (1¡p). And we
have ¹ > ¹. Three equilibria are possible:





2. if ¹ > u > ¹, the equilibrium is not stable: the probability to go to a
SBC equilibrium is p and (1¡p) to an hard budget constraint. E(}) =The Macroeconomics of Massive Giveaways 10
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And we obtain the proposition 2.
Proposition 2 Suppose the government is not reliable when it announces
that it will stop subsidies, expectations are rational, the macroshock u takes















there are three equilibria: a HBC, an unstable and a SBC one.
Note that if the negative external shock u is too important, ceteris paribus,
the unique equilibrium is a SBC one.
3 Discussion
First, the model presented above explains very well the persistence of the
soft budget constraint in the countries of the CIS and why other countries
are in a better path. Second, it helps to give recommendations for policy
makers.
3.1 Why Countries of the Former Soviet Union are so
di®erent from Central European Countries?
At the heart of the model presented above, there is a SBC equilibrium be-
cause of i) the method of privatization and the behavior of managers (empire-
builders) ii) the macroshock and iii) the credibility when a government a±rms
that it stops subsidies. A country which privatizes by massive giveaways staysThe Macroeconomics of Massive Giveaways 11
in a soft budget constraint equilibrium if the government's aim is to avoid a
too important output fall when its economy is hit by an important external
macroshock and if it is not credible when it a±rms that it stops subsidies.
We contend that i), ii) and iii) explain the persistence of the soft budget
constraint in the countries of the CIS and why CEC are in a better path.
First, we assume that managers are empire-builders and loss making ¯rms
are privatized by massive giveaways: they receive control over the restruc-
turing funds and prefer to divert the funds in order to ¯nance losses than to
restructure the ¯rm. The Russian government had not managed to regain
control over the ¯rms and giveaways ¯rms yielding a negative return to the
managers who are empire builders as we argued at the beginning of part 2.
The Georgian, Moldovan and Ukrainian governments privatize by vouchers
too and the same events occur. With the method of gradual sales which
has been applied in Hungary and Poland (Roland [2000]), it does not occur.
Let's take the example of Hungary. In 1990, the State stops spontaneous
privatization which were carried out by insiders. Control by the Hungarian
State Property Agency (HSPA) was ¯rmly reestablished. It avoided that
(empire-builders) managers abused and diverted funds which were for re-
structuring. Consequently the HSPA targeted foreign investors (Debande
and Friebel [2004]).
Second, the macroshock has been worst in the CIS than in the CEC be-
cause of the break up of the CMEA and USSR. On the one hand, the 15
components of the FSU were highly integrated5 and the disintegration led
to the set up of trade barriers between themselves. Some of them have been
engaged in military con°icts (e.g., Armenia versus Azerbaijan) which make
di±cult trade between themselves. In brief, the CIS is an era of disintegra-
5But with trade not based on comparative advantages.The Macroeconomics of Massive Giveaways 12
tion. On the other hand, the Czechoslovak, Hungarian and Polish politicians
has reacted quickly to the collapse of the CMEA. They decided to create a
space of free trade with the Agreement of Visegrad in February 1991, so before
the o±cial dissolution of CMEA (June 1991). The Treaty of Cracow (De-
cember 1992) by creating the Central European Free Trade Area (CEFTA)
¯rmly proved that these countries wanted to be integrated, with the target of
being members of the European Union6. Not by any means the CEFTA be
idealized. Monetary policies have not been coordinated and countries have
pursued beggar-my-neighbors policies by devaluating their currency. But the
contrast between the CIS and the CEC is striking.
Third, we a±rm that governments have been more credible in the CEC
than in the CIS. In the model, the rule requires the government has to
strengthen the budget constraint regardless the current state of the econ-
omy and the external disturbance u. It occurs for example in Poland with
State managers who have begun to restructure when budget constraints have
become harder due to the monetary stabilization and the slowdown of sub-
sidies (Aghion and Blanchard [1994], Pinto et al [1996]). Polish government
stops subsidies regardless of the current state of the economy. But it does
not occurred in Russia because the voucher scheme imposed on the coun-
try has been coupled with manipulated transfers of property into the hands
of the managers and bureaucrats of the nomenklatura who were leaned by
policymakers (see Stern in Hirschler [2000], Kornai [2000]).
6Furthermore, note that Hungary and Poland, during the 80, engaged in foreign trade
which was as likely to be directed to the West as to the East.The Macroeconomics of Massive Giveaways 13
3.2 Policy recommendations
We can argue that a renationalization of the assets privatized by mas-
sive giveaways is a solution if control over the ¯rms by the State is ¯rmly
reestablished and funds injected are really used to restructure the ¯rms. Such
a plan is perhaps di±cult to put in practice in Russia because even during
the socialist area, the government's control over state owned ¯rms has been
weak because control rights had been delegated to managements (Debande
and Friebel [2004], Grosfeld and Senik [1996]).
As we said before, the rule requires the government to stop subsidies
regardless the current state of the economy. The SBC is therefore one of
several commitment problems. A classical solution is to ¯nd an institutional
solution which can solve it. In monetary policy, an institutional solution is
to appoint a conservative central banker, an independent central bank or,
if it is not enough, a de jure dollarization. Here, what is the institutional
solution which makes that government stops subsidies regardless the state of
the economy? Clauses concerning budget de¯cits and restrictions to subsidies
in order to ¯ght against dumping in an economic union may be a solution.
Let's take for example the European Commission: Article 87 of the European
Community Treaty prohibits any aid granted by a member State or through
State resources which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favoring
certain ¯rms7.
We refer only in our model to the ¯scal mean (subsidies and tax conces-
sions). However, we do not have to forget the other mean of softening which
is taking into consideration in the theoretical literature on SBC: the credit
7Note however that Article 87 allows aid having a social character, aid to make
good the damaged caused by natural disasters or aid designed to promote the economic
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Figure 3:
Sources: EBRD [2002].
mean (Kornai et al [2003]). We have to remark that in Russia, when the
relative importance of subsidies in GDP falls, the importance of bad loans
in total loans rises (see ¯gure 1). Czech Republic follows the opposite way
(see ¯gure 2): from 1994 to 1995, it knows a fall in bad loans but a fantastic
increase in subsidies; a stabilization of subsidies and bad loans from 1995 to
1999; and a new rise of subsidies and a drastic reduction of bad loans from
1999 to 2000. The relative importance of bad loans in Czech Republic be-
tween 1995-1999 was still high comparing to Hungary and Poland (see ¯gure
3). Czech Republic adopts fast giveaways to the Czech citizens contrary to
the two other countries mentioned above which put in practice a strategy of
graduate sales (see Kornai [2000], Roland [2000]). In a ¯rst time assets were
dispersed among the citizens. They were concentrated again afterwards in
Investment Funds. However, the owners of the Funds were, in most case,
State-owned banks. Loans were o®ered to ¯nancially troubled ¯rms that
would not have been eligible for credit where standard risk analysis technicsThe Macroeconomics of Massive Giveaways 16
applied.
Therefore, to avoid this phenomenon, banks have to be restructured and
privatized by sales to strengthen the budget constraint. This conclusion is
closed to the post-Keynesian (see Andre® [2003], Taylor [1994]) and theorists
of the SBC (see Dewatripont and Roland [2000]) recommendations, but on
contradiction with policies which were implemented during the nineties: it
was not advised to privatize banks because advisors feared a systemic risk.
Balcerowicz [1995], for example, argues that the privatization of the banking
system is not a priority, contrary to the privatization of ¯rms, because it can
implies a systemic risk. He writes \hasty privatization of State banks may
lead to their subsequent renationalization, as in Chile in 1982". In 1976,
the Chilean banking system is deregulated. The country adopts a Scottish
banking system, i.e. without guarantee for the bank depositors. But until
1981, the banks do not conduct any risk analysis of loans and there is no
banking supervision. With a ¯xed exchange rate and an inertial in°ation
in Chile banks have interest to borrow to foreigners. But from 1981-1982
foreign borrowers begin to withdraw their capitals which obligate the country
to devaluate; the debt explodes. Therefore, the real problem is liberalization
when the banks are not restructured, i.e. when modern technics of risk
analysis are not introduced to select loans.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we have analyzed the syndrome of the SBC and linked
it with privatization policy implemented, credibility of the government and
external macrodisturbance. The softness is normally more important in a
country which has privatized ¯rms in trouble by massive giveaways. Gov-The Macroeconomics of Massive Giveaways 17
ernment uses massive giveaways to managers in order to provide managers
with stronger incentives to make e®ort. But if such a policy is applied and
managers are empire-builders, the economy can be locked into a SBC equi-
librium if the country is hit by an important external negative macroshock.
To escape of this SBC equilibrium, we argue that an institutional solution is
to implement articles concerning State subsidies in economic union. It has
to restructure and to privatize the banking system too in order to avoid that
the managers of the ¯rms use an other mean of softening, the loan.
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